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Abstract
This article underlines the need to call for a re-appropriation of history and the conflict dimension in
Lebanon as  the basis  for  a  new departure.  This  re-appropriation is  twofold:  one goes  back to  the
founding values, and one beyond the reassertion of such values, questioning the National Pact and
Constitution and seeking to reconsider nationhood from the perspective of a new living-together that is
meant to found a new history for the country and be the substratum for the emerging of new historical
“events”: such living together is to take on a local and thus specific secular formula. The latter must be
accompanied by a “productive conflict” acquiring a constant dialectic dimension. This in turn can be
seen on various levels,  including the religious and socio-economic. Finally, the deconstruction and
reconstruction  thus  effected  may only  endure  if  they  are  accompanied  by  new shared  conceptual
complexes that  take  their  departure  from reconsiderations  of  language and textuality  pertaining to
complexes  such  as  earth-land-homeland-space  and  the  spiritual,  all  necessitating  communicative
rationality, in Habermas’s sense.
This article is driven by the implications of the interplay between re-appropriation,
history and conflict, in so far as the consideration and reconfiguration of this interplay has
become a necessity. What I mean by the latter term here has to be taken in the very strong
sense of urgency, imminent danger or threat, as well as a pressing need, as in the German
term Not.  This Not, with its menacing character, is answered with a re-appropriation, a taking
back as one’s own, which I will clarify as to its precise meaning and movement first, before I
determine its specific operations as involving history and conflict.  I am hereby calling for a
specific kind of reconsideration of the history of Lebanon that takes into account, while not
ignoring other factors, the conflictual character it has always displayed. Such conflict is to be
realised anew but in a different configuration, rendering it what I term “productive conflict,”
accompanied and dynamically concomitant with the creation of new conceptual complexes.
The purpose of  the latter, in  and through their  constantly  renewed relation  to  productive
conflict, is to allow for the advancement of Lebanese society and the Lebanese individual in
his/her multifarious connections and dealings with the Other within and without (Salame,
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1988). As I shall seek to prove, these historically bound and forming concepts arise, and may
only emerge, once history is taken seriously as well as questioned, which makes the project
outlined in this article an unavoidable foundation for future progress and peace. 
In order to fully realise the import of the re-appropriation of history and conflict and
thus  determine  their  significance  in  a  way  that  will  answer  our  purpose  of  conceptual
formations  leading to  constant  intellectual  and social  progress within relative  peace,  it  is
important to understand what I mean here by re-appropriation. What this term denotes is a
kind of palimpsest that represents the whole process described in this article, one which must
be clearly delimited before I proceed. I must first note that it amounts, in its  praxis, to a
making or finding something that is already one’s own. It is a recuperative work, a restoring
of what has been lost or forgotten – or lost through having been forgotten. We in Lebanon
have a devoir de mémoire, a memory-duty, toward our past that is at the same time essential
for our determination as a people. It is not just a kind of reminiscence of everything past, but
of what as Gewesenheit, a “having-been,” is still here and determines us, while it remains as
yet unquestioned, despite all the consequences that have followed from its inconspicuous – I
am almost tempted to say “unconscious” – effects, which consequences continue to follow. 
The “re-” in  re-appropriation  is  to  be understood not  only in  the simple sense of
taking back what was once our own, but as a movement to and fro, seeking to go to the
foundational  moment(s)  of the country and its people and coming back, renewed by that
experience, to further allow the “having-been” that we are to blossom and lead us back again
into opened and ever-further-opening paths. This constant movement requires the search by
very keen eyes for the few elements that have been effectively operating for centuries as
invisible centres of self-perpetuating and self-effacing powers. Such elements are often only
half-apparent or show themselves in deceiving guise. For instance, one must wonder what
lies at the heart of the refusal of civil marriage, beyond mere general moral values, by asking
3
who is benefiting from such refusal, and then how such people are benefiting, and then why
they  are  benefiting.  The  same  applies  to  bank  secrecy, trade,  specific  family  structures,
religious  management  and  many  other  issues  which  are  epiphenomena  of  deeper  power
centres and power struggles. This movement will also lead to our dealing with what lies in
certain so-called  foundational events, to evince thereof the determining factors as perennial
and identity-giving. Such work is thus archaeological, ontological and ethical; it is to do with
history as it determines us, is us, seeks to make who we are manifest to us, dynamically finds
and reconfigures our relations and our common telos. The re-appropriation emerges then as a
kind of “revolution,” a term which I must also explain precisely. 
The  revolution  meant  here  has  a  double  determination  that  forms  its  unitary
movement.  It  may  be  first  understood,  for  our  purposes,  with  reference,  without  any
excessively conservative connotations, to Edmund Burke’s understanding of it. Burke, in his
Reflections on the Revolution in France (Burke, 1790/1987), criticises the French Revolution
for its introducing – something unheard of in history – a break, a rupture that does away with
everything and refuses the historical dimension by instituting itself as a beginning ex nihilo,
failing to take over the past in its founding values and obnubilating its effects. To the French
Revolution he opposes the English “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, which was able to bring
back the monarchy through a re-appropriation of original values, thus giving the royal house
renewed legitimacy. I do not wish to engage in an extensive analysis of Burke’s text, even
less to call for some form of autocratic rule. What I wish to retain from his critique is first his
insistence on the deficiencies of the French Revolution, in its “passion” for the universal,
leading  it  to  an  excessively  universal  view  of  “man”  and  to  disengagement  from  the
particular, the changing, that is, history itself; secondly, and more importantly, the definition
of the concept of revolution that comes out of this reassessment: revolution is not to be a
complete break or destruction of a whole system in favour of something entirely new, but the
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act of revolving, turning over and over, going back to the beginning to rediscover what has
always lain there as foundational, then recuperating it in a new fashion.
However, this “recuperation” is not a mere reassertion of old values in Burke’s sense.
What I am calling for here is neither a total refusal and annulment of what is past, what was
and is at the beginning, nor a going back to mere traditions to reanimate them and re-impose
them on the population. Hence the second aspect of what I mean by revolution, and which
holds a kinship with Gadamer’s rehabilitation of tradition (Gadamer, 2004), is also, in its very
going back to  its  origin,  a  critique  of  that  very origin  that  allows  for  a  rediscovery  and
especially a revitalising of the original issue in question. What this means is a serious work
that will open the origin and unveil the multi-faceted foundation of Lebanon, so as to identify
the unconsidered problems therein, especially as they surreptitiously continue to function as a
reactionary rebuttal of peace and progress. The operation is not simple, as it involves even
what may seem like “positive” elements which are yet fraught with ongoing problems – both
undetected  and  affecting  nationhood,  selfhood  and  internal  and  external  relations.  Such
problems must be revisited, not as mere issues to “solve,” but as loci of power and control
and as dynamic foci that must be evinced in their transformative interaction and reconfigured
within a protean network, in such a way as to allow for and become themselves a new ever-
active grounding work on all levels. 
To illustrate, I will take one example, where we may witness such uncovering of the
problems  inherent  in  a  foundation  that  is  otherwise  presented  and  seen  as  positive  and
fostering peace and prosperity. This is done in order to integrate such problems into a fruitful
overarching issue – what the French call a problematique. The example in question is that of
the ever-praised National Pact and its buttressing by such a person as Michel Chiha. The Pact,
when looked at objectively, reflects a mostly Sunni-Maronite dominance of politics, which
reassures urban Sunnis and guarantees a supposed constant political eminence to mountain
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Maronites (Hourani, 1988), prompting Pierre Jemayyel, the Phalange leader, to assert that it
“is an eternal covenant,” constituting Lebanon's essence; losing it, he argues, means losing
Lebanon itself,  something Charles Malek and others have sought to assert in similar vein
(Barakat, 1988, p. 362). From it arises the Mosaic vision of a quasi-static structure (Farsoun,
1988-9).
What lies at the centre of that Pact? Apparently very positive things, some explicit and
some implicit. The reader is able to see them through the lens of tolerance, believing he/she
has access to all the Pact’s meanings, its constitution and its effects.  What Chiha says either
justifies and underlies the National Pact or is the direct and indirect result of its adoption.
Recognising  the  presence  of  problems  within  the  paradoxical  situation  of  the  Lebanese
people, he calls for avoiding excesses: “Instead of awakening jealousies and passions, we
must appease them” (Chiha, 1937/1964, p. 18). We know that such passions are frequently
associated  with  the  presence  of  various  religious  confessions/sects,  which  should  come
together as a nation, for “everything the confessional idea gains,  is what the Nation loses”
(Chiha, 1937/1964, p. 20). This may be achieved through a constant effort to find a middle-
way, a “moyenne” (Chiha,  1937/1964, pp.  72,  93),  an average,  in other words, a kind of
conciliatory middle position – a compromise.2 He even goes on, along the same semantic
line,  to  praise  the  “average”  Lebanese  himself  as  the  “armature”  of  the  country  (Chiha,
1937/1964, p. 73). On the other hand, having warned against the dangers of confessional
divisions, Chiha also insists on a specific identity of Lebanon as “a country of associated
confessional minorities,” which we should not seek to modify, since it is, “in the current state
of  affairs,  natural  and  legitimate,”  “a  structural  phenomenon,”  which  “no  violence  can
change” (Chiha, 1937/1964, pp. 54, 115). To this association of minorities, which is to be
characterised by tolerance (Chiha, 1937/1964, pp. 87, 97), belongs an openness that must be
espoused  and  expressed  through,  for  example,  our  speaking  several  languages  (Chiha,
2  We may think of course of the well-known distribution of powers along confessional lines.
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1937/1964, p. 82). Such openness takes on the form of the famous definition Chiha gives: we
are, or Lebanon is, “a link between East and West” (Chiha, 1937/1964, p. 124). Finally, such
a link is  not  determined – unlike Switzerland – through our  belonging to  a  territory but
through our personality and legislation (Chiha, 1937/1964, pp. 134-5). In other words, there
is an obnubilation of the dimension of belonging to a historical homeland, replaced by a
vague concept of “personality” that no one can truly define and a legislation which, whatever
form it  may take,  is  at  best  the  result  and/or  creation  of  a  nation  and not  the  opposite.
Personality and legislation are not the essence of any nation, but one of its many expressions,
none of which provide a stable definition of the said “link.”  
On the surface of things, these assertions seem to give, for the most part, a positive
conception of who we are, especially coming as they do from the writer of the Constitution
and an emblematic figure of what it means to be Lebanese. However, our going back to them
will  have  to  take  into  account  all  the  evolution  they,  the  country  and  the  people,  have
undergone, all that was not said in them, and all the problems they may hide in their very
exuberance. The first problem to come to mind is the demographic changes the country has
undergone, both unavoidable and ongoing, thus making the Pact anything but “eternal,” its
very  foundation  being  susceptible  to  change.  This  is  just  one  issue.  More  generally,  we
maintain that the origin is not something solely in the past; it is still here with all its half-
hidden and sometimes insurmountable problems, and what was ignored or glossed over in the
past is for the most part subjected to the same treatment today – more radically, indeed, on
occasions. We of course need to question this attitude, this “silencing” of unpalatable truths,
to identify the causes and powers lying behind it. Such requires an archaeological approach to
history, in the style of Foucault, for example. But we should also go back to the words used
and what they tell us, though more importantly what they leave unsaid or hide. Finally, and to
address  more  deeply  the  central  problem,  we  must  emphasize  that  the  origin  is  a
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differentiation, in the Derridian sense. The  moment we think we have grasped it, it falls back
or forward, taking us into another past or another future as its locus, especially in a Lebanon
where the different sects, social groups and movements, find their nostalgia in a mixture of
both real and invented moments (Haugbolle, 2010). The perceived origin is never the true
origin, however much mythology we ascribe to it. All I am here saying about the National
Pact may, I would point out, be applied to many other such claimed origins.
Let us now go back to Chiha and look first at the definition he and others with him
have given: Lebanon is “a link between East and West.” This is supposed to give a lasting
image of  Lebanon as  open to  modernity, to  Eastern  religions,  traditions,  and to  Western
thought, philosophy and so on. However, the word “link,” صلة , slips by unnoticed and thus
remains unquestioned. It seems natural and as such in no need of special attention. And yet it
functions as a “silencing” sign; when it is said, something else has to keep quiet, and that
something is precisely Lebanon. The reader may be surprised at this, for after all the word
seems to be a definition of Lebanon – it refers to it, speaks about it. And yet, if we think
again, we will see that it is no definition, but a mere dissolution of the very thing it purports
to define. To say of Lebanon that it is a “link,” whatever that link may be, is to refuse to
define it. It reduces Lebanon to a relative, insubstantial entity, to no entity at all. A link is not
a thing, it has no mass, no independent existence beyond what it links together, it is in itself
nothing. Hence, whatever two poles Chiha chooses, whatever phantasms they may evoke,
they place the essential,  which is Lebanon, beyond reach, beyond definition,  while at the
same time distracting attention from this very fact. Lebanon remains undefined. With this in
mind,  we  may  understand  Chiha’s  insistence  on  the  “average,”  the  medium  way,  the
compromise, tolerance, and so on. The “average” man is the object of praise for accepting the
communal  divisions as a reality  and a necessity;  compromises  are  encouraged instead of
ways of posing again the question of “who we are” and making this the central issue. 
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Another word may also be examined here: tolerance. Again, the tolerance Chiha calls
for appears as wonderfully peaceable and open to freedom and religion, along with all those
beguiling  connotations  shoved  down  people’s  throats  on  a  daily  basis  by  the  media,
politicians,  and our very culture.  Yet a further and more serious delving into its semantic
content will reveal it as essentially a negative concept, denoting the non-interference of any
one  community  into  the  beliefs,  traditions,  mores and  political  stance  of  the  other.  This
precludes  all  engagement  in  the  dialectic  that  can  render  exchanges  dynamic;  instead,  it
demands acceptance of the status quo as the guarantee of national identity, with the famous
“link” denoting no more than the practice of free trade and openness to capital and banking. 
Much more could and must be said and done with regard to the founding values we
will be returning to, but what I have so far brought to light will suffice for the moment, my
purpose  being  to  clarify  what  I  mean  by  “re-appropriation.”  More  thorough  and
comprehensive reassessment,  or rather re-appropriation,  should lead to a more productive
attitude to history, along with the realisation that a newer basis for nationhood needs to be
established. Engaging in such a process will produce – nay, has already produced – a number
of alternatives. I am not here concerned with delineating them or placing them in all possible
dialectical contexts. What is important is to note that our re-appropriation involves or calls
for a reconsideration. The latter means that we must lay new foundations, replacing those that
underlie the confessional system and the empty notion of “link.” It also means realising that
what is to be appropriated is not just a single origin but a multiplicity of origins, not limited
to  the  French mandate,  the  creation  of  Greater  Lebanon,  and suchlike,  but  to  a  heritage
stretching back to earlier times, earlier decisions, earlier movements, with families and sects
having their origin in the tribes of the past, such as the Ghassanids, Lakhmids, and others
(Salibi, 1988). 
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For a different understanding of nationhood and people, we may first look to Nassif
Nassar’s repeated calls for and work on secularism as giving grounds for a new departure.
Just how long can prejudice last? For so long we have suffered from, and are yet to be rid of,
the  idea  that  secularism,  or ,علمانية   entails  the  abandonment  of  religion  and the  religious
experience. We will not go into endless debate on this issue. What I wish to emphasise – and
here I echo Nassif Nassar (1994) and other theorists in the now century-old tradition of Farah
Antoun (Antoun, 1903/2012) – are two things. First, secularism is not opposed to religion as
a personal or communal spiritual experience. Secondly, secularism, in our situation, will give
religion its freedom while protecting it from partisan politics, specifically the politics of the
confessional system. This is true, and it invalidates Kamal El-Haje’s well-known defence of
confessionalism in  the  sixties  (El-Hage,  1961),  not  least  because  his  optimism has  been
proven wrong. Confessionalism, I would say with Nassar, has led and continues to lead to
less religion (Nassar, 1994, p. 23), while secularism widens the horizon, opening society to a
modernism, which, as Daniel Sibony puts it, “has abolished nothing – neither the holy, nor
sin, nor its transfer; it has simply widened the field of the metaphor’s application” (Sibony,
1992, p. 203).  Whatever intellectual misunderstandings have occurred in the past with regard
to secularism and the fear of its adverse effect on religion, what we need for our purpose is to
maintain its validity as a first step that gets to the heart of our nation’s origin, opening it as a
locus for new questioning and new productive thinking. Indeed, while secularism is never
subservient to religion, it never says “no” to religion, seeking its destruction. It does not reject
tradition; nor is it an unchanging and non-negotiable concept – it is not dogma. Secularism
opens and reopens a space for all forms of constructive debate, communicative action and
reason, which, in its very disunity,3 will help establish many places for ethical, moral, social
and political decisions. 
3  I am thinking of course of Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Habermas (1984).
10
Secularism is not meant to be the overall and final solution, although it has emerged
here as an essential.  It must be accompanied by what I may term a “productive conflict,”
which will first absorb non-productive, “false” and sterile conflicts while developing its own
modus operandi and conceptually-binding dynamics.  We may consider the development of
this “productive conflict” on two important levels, at least as far as Lebanon is concerned, the
religious  and the socio-economic  – although this  does not  exhaust  the possible  levels  of
development. 
On the religious level, it means going beyond religious differences. Difference, as we
have known since Plato and Aristotle, does allow for a definition (Aristotle, 1941, p. 160), for
naming, but allows little beyond that. I do not, of course, claim that we should erase or ignore
differences, as some states have tried to do in the past in the name of a view of equality that is
no more than the identity of a totalitarian ipse. What I mean here is a kind of Aufhebung, a
raising, a sublating, a taking-up of the religious diversity question, bringing it into dynamic,
dialectic,  permeable  and protean  dimensions,  each  of  which  has  its  own specific  role  in
keeping the question open and productive. Religions, through this process, will be exactly
what they are not at present. They will constantly transform their very essence – unlike today,
when they are kept as an unchanging, underlying substance for all religious “accidents” –
lying not in a timeless, eternal being, but in a continual becoming. They will open for each
other  new  theological  paths,  allowing  ontological  questions  and  hermeneutics  to  be
reconsidered. This transformative to-and-fro movement is only possible if in interacting they
accept the “danger” of responsible questioning. The term “danger” is not used here simply to
surprise; the concept is at the heart of the work I am calling for, since “danger” is the sine
qua non possibility – or perhaps we should say corollary – of all honest thinking. This can
best be understood through a reference to Heidegger, who states that faith, when it is valid,
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exposes itself to the possibility – the “danger” – of non-faith4 (Heidegger, 1983, p. 6). In
other  words,  and  for  our  specific  purpose,  each  religion  will  have  to  expose  its  own
foundations,  be  they  textual  or  historical,  to  other  religions,  whether  like  or  unlike  it  in
character, whether affirming or negating what it stands for. Sometimes exposure of this kind
will indeed lead to negation by the other, yet this very “negative” can be productive, fostering
progress and leading to new horizons of truth and understanding. In this shared intellectual
and social process, religions will be the agent of their own positive development. For all this
to occur, however, sectarianism must slowly leave the scene,  to be replaced by religious
dialectic and dialogue.  
The socio-economic sphere is, in Lebanon, closely connected to the religious one with
its emphasis on confessional communities, whatever changes this connection has undergone.
New  interactive  processes  between  communities  will  have  to  accompany  the  above
reconsideration  or  reformulation  of  the  National  Pact  and the introduction  of  secularism.
These processes will serve new ends, a new telos, whereby problems of poverty, the middle
class,  inequalities,  women’s  and  children’s  rights,  the  disabled,  and  so  on,  are  never
fundamentally  linked  to  religious-communal  identities  and  institutions,  but  to  a  common
struggle  to  reach  equality  and  justice.  Debates  may  then  be  initiated  with  the  aim  of
formulating new maxims governing socio-economic issues, and having universal validity and
axiological relevance.  While religions may continue to engage in some of their charitable
work, the state should offer universal, non-religion-bound aid that takes precedence over and
is superior to religiously-restricted aid. In other words, the individual must see in the state the
guarantor of a cohesion that is not only above any other but also ensures that all forms of
cohesion are possible since it prepares and secures the space wherein all interactions can both
take place and do so in freedom. 
4  “[...] ist [...] Glaube, wenn er sich nicht ständig der Möglichkeit des Unglaubens aussetzt, auch kein Glauben, 
sondern eine Bequemlichkeit.” My translation of the same line is: “... when faith does not continually expose 
itself to the possibility of unfaith, it is no faith at all, but a convenience.”
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This productive conflict will be a fertile ground for the discovery and creation of new
conceptual complexes leading to advancement at every level. New concepts will arise whose
content and definition will be open to dynamic reconsideration, and they will generate ever
new relational complexes, mobilising social, spiritual and intellectual hubs that will augment
individual and national powers of development and cohesion. They will especially develop
new common analytical and synthetic grounds and "meeting places," whose purpose will be
the defining and redefining of “belonging” and “being together.” Once again, we can offer an
example to illustrate this foundational operation through productive conflict. 
One notion that will arise as the generator of a conceptual complex, provoking into
relational motion a whole set of concepts whose combination through productive, conflictual
work will always be specific and unique, is that of “Lebanese earth.” Once we decide, having
interacted  in  social  and intellectual  meeting  places,  to  accept  this  notion  and explore  its
meaning and effectiveness, as well as our renewed relation to it with the aim of increasing
conjoined  powers  of  general  advancement,  a  whole  constellation  of  prominent  and
increasingly  complex notions  will  emerge.  This  “earth”  notion opens up the  Heimat,  the
home, and thus also the land as home and possibility of home, and then the concept of space.
We  soon  find  ourselves  in  the  earth-land-homeland-space  complex.  This  conceptual
complexity is also conceptual precision, so that what is ever more complex is accompanied
by an ever clearer and more precise/distinct vision and thus efficacious political provision and
legislation. Hence, a spiritual element, in the Hegelian sense, enters the equation as both an
essential mode and concept interacting with this complex and bringing in notions to develop,
such as that of “residing” or the “hearth.” What began as a concept of earth and was taken
into the earth-land-homeland-space complex develops the very specific ideas of a “spiritual
residing” under heaven and on earth, which can later be utilised to establish a nationwide
bond that is always negotiated, strengthened, reconfigured and reasserted. Such a bond, being
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the  repeated  and  renewed  result  of  “dialogic-communicative  reason,”  to  use  Habermas'
phrase, and employed across communities in productive conflictual work, will be beyond any
parochial consideration in its very universally-binding character, as well as in the freedom
always involved in its determination. It will, through this “Lebanese earth” idea, have the
power to integrate the elements of the “conflictual” process, creating a “whole” which will in
turn produce the meaning, direction and efficacy of its deployment. “Lebanese earth” is thus
not only a physical, geographical, geological question or matter, but implies a reconsideration
of  notions  such  as  “belonging,”  “Lebanese  history,”  “respect  for  our  environment,”
“Lebanese education,” and so on.
There is of course much more involved in the question of “earth.” Needless to say, it
is one fraught with controversies, especially if approached from a Marxist perspective. This is
not the issue here. Neither should one think that we are somehow “deifying” earth, since we
are making it a ground of possibilities and not a summum ens, the highest being; earth may be
transcendental, in the Kantian sense, but is never transcendent. Suffice it to say that it is one
notion that lends itself well to new configurations and conceptual work through productive
conflict, which implies each time re-appropriation, revolution and productive work, as I have
interpreted  these  terms,  far  beyond  mere  negative  tolerance.  The  Other,  local  and
international, textual and spiritual, is to be approached and engaged, communities are to be
newly articulated and placed in danger, in the sense I have expounded, and a people will
move forward as institutions guarantee the kind of education and polis ushered in and shaped
through these modes of interaction and life-sharing, al-'aysh al mushtarak (العيش المشترك). 
I end with this key term, al-‘aysh al mushtarak, since it frames, along with the urgent
need I began with, this whole article and the project it proposes. The urgent need that is now
ours  is  met  through  reappropriation,  revolution,  productive  conflict,  and  conceptual
complexes, so as to give full power and sustainability to “living together.” This will be done,
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finally, by giving meaning to this “living together,” turning it from an empty notion as an
instrument  for  propaganda  to  a  living  concept  that  permeates  the  lives  of  people  and
communities, making their thinking mobile and so becoming a “pro-ject” in the Heideggerian
sense. The concept in fact amounts to a thinking that is futural and responsible, taking root in
the temporal  and historical  possibilities  of  Dasein,  a  people “being there” in  their  world
(Heidegger, 1927, pp. 52-9) or, more specifically, on Lebanese earth as interpreted above.
And where there is responsibility, there will also and inevitably be reasonableness and reason
– and hence philosophy.
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